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VI 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment ruling on June 23, 2004, in 
which the trial court granted Christopherson, Farris, White & Utley, P.C.'s 
(hereinafter "the firm") motion for summary judgment against defendant/appellant 
Deanna Pugh (hereinafter "Deanna"). This appeal was timely filed, and later was 
transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
78-2A-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Deanna brings the following issues for review: 
First Issue 
The trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment of the 
firm's breach of contract cause of action. The trial court applied the wrong 
standard of law. It failed to apply the correct elements for a breach of contract 
cause of action related to an attorney-client contract and it permitted the firm to 
succeed in its case without proving or pleading it performed its contractual duties 
or that it billed Deanna fair, reasonable and accurate charges. These were issues 
of material fact that should have prevented the firm's motion for summary 
judgment. 
1 
Standard of Review 
The first issue can be decided as a matter of law under Bennett v. Jones, 
70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003). 
Second Issue 
The trial court erred in dismissing Deanna's fraud cause of action 
when Deanna properly pled all of the required elements. 
Standard of Review 
The second issue can be decided as a matter of law. Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991); Sernenov v. Hill 982 P.2d 578 (Utah). 
Third Issue 
The trial court erred in dismissing Deanna's breach of contract cause of 
action because Deanna properly pled that she performed under the agreement. The 
firm admitted to submitting an incorrect bill for payment only after it initiated its 
lawsuit. Deanna was right not to pay the fraudulent bill, and the firm admitted that 
Deanna was not obligated to pay that bill. Therefore, Deanna properly pled she 
performed under the contract and the firm breached its contractual obligations. 
Standard of Review 
The third issue can be decided as a matter of law under Bennett v. Jones, 
70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003). 
2 
Fourth Isssue 
The trial court erred in dismissing Deanna's cause of action for the firm's 
breach of its fiduciary duties. Deanna was damaged by the firm's breach and 
properly pled damages in her Answer and Counterclaim. 
Standard of Review 
The fourth issue can be decided as a matter of law. Bennett v. Jones. 70 
P.3d 17 (Utah 2003). 
Fifth Issue 
The trial court erred in dismissing Deanna's cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress because Deanna properly pled damages and factual 
allegations that should be considered conduct that is "outrageous" and 
"intolerable." 
Standard of Review 
The fifth can be decided as a matter of law. Franco v. The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints. 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001); Bennett v. Jones. 70 P.3d 17 
(Utah 2003). 
Sixth Issue 
The trial court erred in awarding the firm its attorney's fees incurred in 
prosecuting its breach of contract action and in defending Deanna's breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional 
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distress claims. The agreement's language did not allow for such award, and the 
trial court abused its discretion by not requiring the firm's counsel to comply with 
Utah R.Civ.P. 73(b). Due to the ambiguous nature of the award, the firm charged 
attorney's fees and costs that were unverified and patently umeasonable knowing 
that it now had a carte blanche judgment against Deanna. 
Standard of Review 
The sixth can be decided as a matter of law. Turtle Management, Inc. 
v. Haggis Management Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. vs. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Utah App. 1989); Loosle v. 
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n.. 858 P.2d 999, 1003 (Utah 1993); Maynardv. 
Wharton. 916 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AS TO ALL ISSUES 
On appeal from a summary judgment, evidence is reviewed in a light 
most favorable to the losing party. An award of summary judgment is 
appropriate only if the pleadings, affidavits, and other submissions of the parties 
show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. (56(c); Utah 
State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light. 776 P.2d 632, 
634 (Utah 1989); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co.. 714 P.2d 648, 649 
(Utah 1986). Deanna further admits that a mere conflict in fact is not enough to 
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challenge a summary judgment on appeal: the fact must be material. 
This Court, on appeal from summary judgment, reviews the trial court's 
legal conclusions with no deference for correctness, and indeed all inferences 
which may be drawn from the facts should be made in the non-moving party's 
favor. Pride Stables v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc., 82 P.3d 198, 201 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2003). 
PRESERVATION OF ALL ISSUES 
All of the issues were preserved in multiple motions and memoranda before 
the trial court, especially the motions and memoranda supporting and disputing 
the firm's motions for summary judgment. See Record Index pp. 1, 7, 56, 65, 346, 
348, 407, 412, 424, 656, 661, 767, 776, 873, 889. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Deanna brings the following statement of the case for the Court's review: 
Nature of the Case 
The firm initiated a breach of contract to force Deanna into paying a 
fraudulently mailed May 7, 2003 invoice and/or be liable for "unbilled" fees as 
shown in its July 15, 2003 "Sample Invoice." Deanna answered the Complaint 
with an Answer and Counterclaim for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, 
fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The firm's fees charged to Deanna are heavily disputed for several different 
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reasons, including billing by people other than the designated attorney to perform 
the exact same tasks, double billing for the presence of a senior attorney with the 
designated attorney, who had barely passed the bar and lacked the experience to 
attend such hearings by himself, unbeknownst to Deanna, without Deanna's 
notification and prior authorization, billing for the same costs on two separate bills, 
billing for three attorneys to discuss the bill after the firm withdrew as counsel, and 
billing paralegal fees at $65.00 per hour for clerical tasks even though the firm did 
not employ paralegals, the firm only employed Legal Assistants at the rate of 
$60.00 per hour. 
These contentions are material as to whether these fees were fair and 
reasonable and pursuant to the terms of the contract. Because they were not fair or 
reasonable, there are material issues of fact to which summary judgment was 
granted inappropriately in this matter. Deanna also disputes that the firm 
performed its duties as required under an attorney-client relationship. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The Firm asserted the following grounds to support its motion for summary 
judgment: 
1. Summary judgment on the firm's breach of contract cause of action 
should be granted because: (i) a legal right has been invaded by Deanna; (ii) 
Deanna's actions are the cause in fact of the firm's damages; and (iii) the firm has 
clearly been damaged by Deanna's actions. 
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2. Summary judgment on Deanna's fraud claim should be granted 
because (i) Deanna has not sufficiently pled that the firm made a material 
representation; and (ii) Deanna has not sufficiently pled that the firm had not made 
a material misrepresentation regarding a. presently material fact. 
3. Summary judgment on Deanna's breach of contract claim should be 
granted because (i) Deanna has not pled that she performed under the terms of the 
parties' contract; and (ii) Deanna has failed to assert the breach of an express 
promise by the firm. 
4. Summary judgment on Deanna's breach of fiduciary duty claim 
should be granted because (i) no causal link to damages exists in the present case 
and (ii) Mr. Bernard's actions constitute superceding and intervening acts, which 
cut off the firm's liability, if any exists. 
5. Summary judgment on Deanna's intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim should be granted because Deanna has not pled facts that can 
constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The trial court granted the firm's motion for summary judgment on all causes 
of action made in its complaint only, and by doing so, abused its discretion 
and disregarded the law: 
The trial court granted the firm's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 23, 
2004. (See Addendum at A7? Summary Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Record Index p. 656.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On approximately November 1, 2002, Deanna discovered that efforts were 
underway to exhume the body of her son by her son's third wife of 11 months. 
Deanna sought legal representation, and met with Eric Gentry ("Gentry"), an 
associate attorney with Christopherson, Farris, White & Utley, P.C., of St. George, 
Utah. During the initial interview, Deanna signed a fee agreement after Gentry 
explained to her the terms of their relationship. (See Record Index p. 424, 
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A, paragraphs 22-27; see also Record Index 
p. 661.) Under this agreement, Deanna believed that Gentry was to be her attorney 
at an hourly rate of $125.00. A third notation of this understanding was included 
in the notes portion of the fee agreement. (See Addendum at Al, the Fee 
Agreement.) 
Gentry prepared documents initiating a Petition for Permanent 
Injunction. On December 16 and December 17, 2002, a hearing was held to 
determine whether or not the temporary restraining order would become a 
permanent injunction. The trial court continued the hearing for his determination 
of the outcome until after the holidays. At some point soon after, the trial court 
scheduled the continued hearing for March 2003. Without authorization from 
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Deanna and just immediately before the scheduled hearing of March 20, 2003, 
Gentry continued that hearing date until April 15, 2003. 
In the midst of the battle to protect her son's grave and prior to Deanna 
becoming aware of the firm's fraudulent billing practices and Gentry's failure to 
perform his duties under the contract, Deanna paid Gentry $4,000, which was 
$4,000 beyond the $500 estimated by Gentry to handle the exhumation injunction. 
Due to Gentry's repeated failure to communicate with Deanna about the status and 
preparation of her case, Deanna sought the advise of another attorney. On or about 
April 11, 2003, in the hopes that the payment of $4,500 to Gentry provided some 
research and reasonable argument in support of Deanna's case, she requested that 
co-counsel be allowed to assist Gentry with her case. Gentry then withdrew. 
Upon Gentry's withdrawal, it became apparent that he was grossly 
unprepared for the hearing scheduled in a few days based upon the client file that 
was delivered to Deanna's new counsel. In fact, it was discovered, after Gentry's 
withdrawal, that the opposing party had filed a Trial Memorandum months before 
that Gentry had completely failed to discuss with Deanna so she could be informed 
about the opposing party's case. At no time during Gentry's representation did 
Gentry inform Deanna about the contents and allegations contained in the opposing 
party's Trial Memorandum. (See Record Index p. 424, Defendant's Memorandum 
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of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Ex. A, paragraph 33.) 
After Gentry withdrew from her case and Deanna discovered that Gentry 
had not prepared her case nor had informed her about critical aspects of her case, 
the firm sent her a final bill dated May 7, 2003, that reflected an amount due and 
owing that was well beyond the amount of money she believed she had to spend on 
the case, based upon her initial conversation with Gentry. 
The May 7, 2003 invoice was excessive, calculated a balance due and owing 
that was fraudulent and inaccurate, and requested fees for work Gentry performed 
on April 11, 2003, even though he had chosen to withdraw as counsel in the early 
morning of that day, and also reflected fees for work performed by other members 
of the firm days after the firm had withdrawn. In addition, this invoice reflected 
additional attorney fees for an attorney whom Deanna had never met to apparently 
discuss the firm's former client, Deanna, and her case with the opposing party's 
counsel in the exhumation case. {See Addendum at A3, the May 7, 2003 invoice; 
see also Record Index p. 424, Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A.) 
Due to the firm's unfair, excessive and fraudulent billing as well as the fact 
that the firm had withdrawn as counsel in the midst of the case, Deanna did not pay 
the May 7, 2003 invoice. 
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On June 3, 2003, the firm initiated a lawsuit against Deanna for Breach of 
Contract, demanding payment of monies it claimed Deanna owed. Deanna sought 
another attorney to no avail, and answered pro se on June 23, 2003 and counter-
claimed with breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress causes of action. (See Answer and Counterclaim, 
Record Index p. 7.) Litigation ensued between the parties. 
On June 23, 2004, the trial court granted summary judgment for the firm and 
against Deanna, first finding no genuine issue of material fact, and further noting 
that Deanna's opposition was "quibbling over irrelevancies." (See Addendum at 
A7.) Second, the court determined that her arguments were based upon, inter alia, 
unrealistic expectations, unrealistic view of the attorney/client relationship, 
"cynical speculation of acts, motives, and events that did not occur," a lack of an 
understanding of the unusual nature of the unique legal matter the firm was 
employed to address on Deanna5 s behalf, and a lack of understanding of "legal 
services and the ethical obligations of attorneys." (See Addendum at A8.) 
Finally, the trial court made much ado about its conclusions that someone 
was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law on Deanna's behalf, sternly 
closing its ruling with the admonishment that "this Court does not sanction the 
unauthorized practice of law or knowingly allow any litigant to profit from the 
unauthorized practice of law." (See Addendum at A8.) Based upon these three 
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rationale, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the firm, along with the 
full amount of unpaid fees for services the firm allegedly rendered, interest on 
those unpaid fees, and reasonable attorney's fees and costs for the breach of 
contract action. (See Addendum at A8.) 
Shortly after the summary judgment, in an attempt to correct the trial court's 
conclusion that Deanna, a pro se litigant, or someone on her behalf, was engaging 
in the unauthorized practice of law, Deanna set forth the details of her pro se 
representation in an affidavit attached to her Rule 52(b) and Rule 59(e) Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment (see Record Index p. 661) and also again addressed 
many of the factual issues that she believed were material in this case. This motion 
to alter or amend the judgment was denied by the trial court on August 20, 2004. 
This Appeal followed. (See Addendum at A13, Record Index p. 875.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court, by granting summary judgment upon all of the 
grounds as set forth by the firm, abused its discretion as follows: (1) by its failure 
to apply the correct standard of law to the firm's breach of contract claim, (2) by its 
failure to rule that Deanna sufficiently pled material misrepresentations to 
presently material facts in her cause of action for fraud, (3) by its failure to rule 
Deanna sufficiently pled in her Answer and Counterclaim, and throughout the 
other documents presented to him, a cause of action for breach of contract, (4) by 
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its failure to rule Deanna sufficiently pled damages as a result of the firm's alleged 
breach of its fiduciary duties, and (5) by its failure to rule that Deanna sufficiently 
pled facts sufficient to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress due to the special nature of the attorney-client relationship. 
Further, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the 
firm for prosecuting and defending against Deanna's causes of action when the 
language in the fee agreement fails to support such award and when the firm's 
attorneys failed to comply with Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, even 
though Deanna requested such compliance. 
ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE FIRM'S BREACH OF CONTRACT 
CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND WAS 
CLEARLY AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
In its own breach of contract case, the firm identified Utah's three part test 
for breach of contract claims, namely that a plaintiff must establish invasion of a 
legal right, a causal connection between the legal wrong suffered and damages 
claimed, and sufficiently certain damages. See Winsness v. M.J. Conoco 
Distributors, Inc., 593 P.2d 1303,1305 (Utah 1979); Gould v. Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 309 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1957); Terry v. Panek, 631 
P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1981); 5A Corbin, Contracts Section 1022 (1964). 
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While the trial court found that the firm suffered a breach of the contract between 
itself and Deanna, it chose to ignore the same standard in Deanna's counterclaim 
and instead followed the firm's position that Deanna's breach of contract was not 
sufficiently pled. 
Deanna's argument has always been that the firm breached its contract to 
provide her with legal services of a certain standard, namely to provide competent 
service, bill reasonably and accurately, and communicate with the client. As the 
firm identified to the trial court: 
When legal services are involved, c[a]n action for breach of a 
promise is governed by rules of contract rather than rules of 
legal malpractice.' 1 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, 
Legal Malpractice section 8.5, at 590 (4th ed. 1996). To 
properly state a cause of action for breach of contract in the 
'context of legal representation and an attorney-client 
relationship, a plaintiff [counterclaimant] must plead (1) 
[existence of] a valid and enforceable contract; (2) 
performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the express promise 
by the defendant; and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulting 
from the breach.' Bennett v. Jones, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003). 
While arguing in its summary judgment motion that Deanna failed to plead that she 
performed under the contract, the firm itself failed to plead in its own cause of 
action that it performed all of its obligations under the contract. (See Plaintiffs 
Complaint, Record Index p. 1; see also Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index p. 348.) 
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The firm also suggested that Deanna's contention that the agreement 
included the expectation to bill fairly and accurately "may apply to a breach of 
contract issue, but does not constitute a material misrepresentation as required 
under a fraud cause of action. The case law cited by Defendant again applied to 
breach of contract action regarding attorney's fees, not a fraud claim." (See 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index p. 610). While the firm admitted 
that Deanna's breach of contract claim was possible, Deanna's claim was later 
dismissed. Even though the firm failed to plead its performance under the 
agreement, failed to plead the charges were fair and reasonable, and admitted some 
validity to Deanna's breach of contract claim, the trial court ignored the apparent 
contradiction when it dismissed Deanna's claim and granted the firm's summary 
judgment motion regarding the same cause of action. 
The trial court abused its discretion by applying a different standard of law 
to the firm versus the standard of law applied to Deanna, and therefore this Court 
should vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for trial on its merits. The 
trial court was well aware of Deanna's contentions and the legal authority behind 
her position. Deanna identified Bennett v. Jones, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003), and 
always maintained the position that there was no language in the firm's Complaint 
establishing that it performed its duties under the contract. (See Defendant's 
15 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Record Index p. 424.) 
It is ultimately obvious that granting summary judgment where there are 
issues of material fact was inappropriate at this juncture. A close examination of 
the documents presented to the trial court throughout the litigation establishes 
factual disputes regarding the firm's performance under the agreement. For 
instance, the fee agreement did not contain the explicit or express language that 
Deanna was responsible for a "sample invoice" that the firm attached to a motion 
filed with the trial court three months after the firm initiated its breach of contract 
claim. Even with the blatant factual issue, the trial court awarded the firm "unpaid 
fees" that included fees addressed in the "sample invoice" at an annual interest rate 
of 18 percent. The trial court abused his discretion by awarding unbilled fees and 
interest upon those unbilled fees. A "sample invoice" and 18 percent interest upon 
a "sample invoice" was never within the four corners of the fee agreement. (See 
Addendum at A5, July 15, 2003 "sample invoice.") Deanna identified these 
discrepancies whenever she could; however the trial court chose to ignore the 
factual discrepancies and issue a summary judgment for the firm instead. 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEANNA'S FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE 
CLIENT PROPERLY PLED ALL OF THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS 
The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed Deanna's fraud 
cause of action apparently based upon the following two grounds: (i) Deanna had 
not sufficiently pled that the firm made a material representation; and (ii) Deanna 
had not sufficiently pled that the firm made a material misrepresentation regarding 
a presently material fact. However, Deanna5 s Counterclaim did plead that the firm 
made a material representation to Deanna, to which Deanna alleged throughout the 
litigation. (See Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index p. 424; 
Defendant/Counterclaimant's Rule 52(b) and Rule 59(e) Motions to Alter or 
Amend Judgment, Record Index pp. 661 and 776.) 
The firm argued that Deanna failed to sufficiently plead that it had made a 
material representation and further asserted the following: 
In paragraph 47 of Defendant's Counterclaim, Defendant 
asserts that c[u]nder the attorney-client contract, Plaintiff 
represented to Defendant/Counterclaimant that Plaintiff would 
bill for its time fairly and accurately.' . . . . within the four 
corners of the agreement between the parties, Plaintiff did not 
represent that 'Plaintiff would bill for its time fairly and 
accurately,' nor does Defendant assert the same. 
However, as shown by the firm's own restatement of Deanna's counterclaim, it is 
very clear that Deanna did assert that the firm did in fact represent to her that it 
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would bill for its time fairly and accurately. Deanna, in her opposition to summary 
judgment, identified that in paragraphs 46 and 47 of her Counterclaim she pled that 
she entered into an agreement for legal services with Eric Gentry thereby 
establishing an attorney-client contract; and that under the attorney-client contract 
(establishing both the written fee agreement as well as the implied duties that make 
up an attorney-client relationship), the firm 'represented' to her, through 
Mr. Gentry's statements and through the written fee agreement, that Plaintiff 
would bill for its time fairly and accurately as well as 'encourage a process of 
communication' to keep her abreast of events and to see that matters progress to 
her satisfaction, among others. (See Answer and Counterclaim, Record Index p. 7; 
see also Record Index p. 424, Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A, 
paragraphs 22-23.) 
In order for the fee agreement to be enforceable, the firm must bill fair and 
reasonable charges unless otherwise stated in the agreement; otherwise, the terms 
and conditions of the contract would be "absurd," therefore invalidating all terms 
of the contract. (See In Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P.3d 188 (2003). 'The 
parties dispute whether the language of the contract explicitly requires that 
recoverable costs and fees be reasonable. However, to interpret the contract so as 
to allow unreasonable costs and fees would reduce the costs and fees recovery 
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provision "to absurdity."' Id. Thus, we hold that this contract does require 
reasonableness." (emphasis added). 
The firm's position contradicted Heritage Imports' holding, as it moved in 
its summary judgment motion that it did not need explicit language governing 
reasonable fees. Its position is further bolstered by the firm's additional arguments 
that Deanna failed to assert that the firm made the verbal representation to bill 
fairly and accurately at any time during their attorney/client relationship. Besides 
the implication of such a position that if there is no language in the four comers of 
an agreement or verbal promises made regarding fair and accurate billing that a 
law firm should not be held responsible for unfair and inaccurate billing, summary 
judgment should have never been granted as whether representations were or were 
not made are issues of material fact that must be decided by the trier of fact only. 
(See Defendant's Counterclaim, Record Index p. 7; Defendant's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs motion for Summary Judgment, 
Record Index p. 424.) 
In addition, the firm in its motion for summary judgment, on page 11, made 
the following statement: "In the present case, Defendant [sic] concedes that an 
attorney client relationship existed and Plaintiff [had] various fiduciary/ethical 
duties to Defendant as a result of the attorney-client relationship." Deanna set 
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forth the following law in her opposition to motion for summary judgment that 
states explicitly what fiduciary duties the firm owed to Deanna: 
"'[A]ctions [for breach of fiduciary duty] are grounded 
on the fundamental principle that attorneys must be 
completely loyal to their clients and must never use 
their position of trust to take advantage of client 
confidences for themselves or for other parties.' 
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 
1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). cIn all relationships with 
clients, attorneys are required to exercise impeccable 
honesty, fair dealing, and fidelity.' Id. (emphasis added.) 
Indeed, due to their 'professional responsibility and the 
confidence and trust' that their clients 'legitimately 
repose' in them, attorneys 'must adhere to a high 
standard of honesty, integrity [,] and good faith in 
dealing with' their clients. Id. (quotations and citations 
omitted.) Attorneys are 'not permitted to take 
advantage of [their] position or superior knowledge 
to impose upon [clients]; nor to conceal facts or law, 
nor in any way deceive [clients]; without being 
held responsible therefor.' Id. (emphasis added) 
(quotations and citation omitted.)' See Walter v. 
Stewart, 2003 UT App. 86 (filed March 27, 2003, 
CaseNo.20010866-CA)." 
(See pp. 26 and 27 of Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index 
p. 424.) 
If a client cannot rely upon its law firm to bill him or her fairly or accurately 
without the explicit language in a fee agreement that states "The firm will bill you 
fairly and accurately," then it would behoove any court to require specific language 
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to the same to ensure that the firm will be held responsible for billing that is unfair 
and inaccurate. 
Regarding the firm's assertion that Deanna failed to sufficiently plead a 
material misrepresentation regarding a presently material fact, the firm made the 
following argument: ". . . Defendant has asserted that fraud occurred because 
Plaintiff somehow padded bills, had staff bill for services, sent out a bill on April 
17, 2003, which was inaccurate and did not disclose opposing counsel filed a Trial 
Memorandum . . . ." Apparently the trial court and the firm do not regard the 
firm's alleged padding of bills, billing $65.00 for paralegals to perform clerical 
tasks, double-billing and the myriad of other disputed facts with regard to this Law 
Firm's bill as a presently material fact for a jury to determine. Once again, to 
ignore these issues of material fact does not allow for summary judgment. 
The firm also has admitted to mailing an inaccurate bill dated May 7, 
2003, but the firm only admitted to mailing this inaccurate bill three months 
after it initiated its breach of contract cause of action and only after Deanna 
attached the fraudulently mailed May 7, 2003 bill as an exhibit to her opposition to 
the firm's first motion for summary judgment. (See Defendant/Counterclaimant's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed August 15, 2003, Record Index p. 65.) 
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Further, in Deanna's opposition to this motion for summary judgment, she 
addressed the following Law Firm's presently material misrepresentations as 
follows: 
"Defendant, throughout her fraud claim, asserted presently 
material facts which have been shown to be false 
representations, both from the written fee agreement and 
from the implied attorney-client relationship that clearly 
existed, such as billing paralegal fees for secretarial 
duties consisting of typing and copying, and other 
billing procedures that were not provided for under the 
Agreement. Plaintiff fraudulently billed outside of 
the explicit terms of the Agreement in order to induce 
Defendant into paying these fraudulent and excessive 
fees. In addition, Plaintiff has now admitted to 
falsely billing time associated with the May 7, 2003 
invoice. It is now the job of the fact-finder to determine 
if Plaintiff 'inadvertenly' mailed this bill or if it was 
intentionally and willfully mailed in an attempt to 
induce Defendant into paying even more fraudulent 
fees than had already been extracted from Defendant. 
In addition, based upon new information that Defendant 
obtained through research, Mr. Gentry represented to 
Defendant at the time of the execution of the Agreement 
that he was qualified to handle her case. In fact, 
Mr. Gentry had just been admitted to the Bar approximately 
two weeks prior to taking on this case. Had Mr. Gentry 
informed Defendant that he was just recently admitted 
to the Bar, that he would require assistance from other 
members of the firm, that he would bill for secretarial 
duties, that he would bill for three attorneys in the firm 
to discuss the bill, that he would not keep Defendant 
informed about important aspects of her case, Defendant 
would not have entered into the Agreement with Plaintiff. 
Defendant relied on Mr. Gentry to be truthful about these 
representations based upon the one basic fact that he is 
an attorney-at-law and attorneys are held to a higher 
moral standard than most because of the position they 
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hold as a fiduciary to their client. Defendant's fraud 
claim is well pled and should be placed before a jury." 
(See pp. 24 and 25 of Defendant's Memorandum on Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index, 
p. 424.) 
At issue in this case is not the reasonableness of $125.00 per hour for 
Mr. Gentry's time, nor the hourly rate of any employee of the firm, as put forth in 
the fee agreement. However, there are unanswered questions of material fact 
surrounding the validity of the time billed and the charges stemming from more 
than one person performing the same task. 
As a matter of law, the trial court erred in granting the firm's summary 
judgment on Deanna's fraud cause of action because Deanna did sufficiently plead 
her fraud cause of action and did, in fact, plead facts that were disputed by the 
firm, and those disputed facts should be placed before a jury. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEANNA'S BREACH OF CONTRACT 
CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE 
DEANNA PROPERLY PLED ALL OF THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS 
The firm argued that Deanna failed to plead that she performed under the 
terms of the parties' contract and, therefore, Deanna's breach of contract claim 
should be dismissed for failing to assert the required element of "performance" 
under a breach of contract claim. This is an inaccurate statement. 
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Deanna paid the required $500.00 that the firm (by and through its 
employee, Mr. Eric Gentry) estimated the injunction would cost as well as an 
additional $4,000 due to the presumption that the firm, by and through Mr. Eric 
Gentry, was performing its duties under the contract. However, when Deanna 
discovered that the firm was not fulfilling its obligations under the contract, 
doubted the firm's performance and questioned the authenticity of the work 
claimed to have been performed and billed on the billings statements mailed to 
Deanna, the contract between the parties was breached. This breach was further 
manifest when Deanna later received a bill for additional monies on a May 7, 2003 
invoice the firm later recanted. First the firm expected Deanna to pay the bill, then 
later waved off the bill as a mistake. Once again, this matter was material, and 
should have been presented to a jury for determination, not the trial court. (See 
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index p. 424; Answer and 
Counterclaim, Record Index p. 7.) 
The firm goes on to argue to the trial court that Deanna failed to assert the 
breach of an express promise by Plaintiff. This argument is untrue. The firm 
stated the following in its motion for summary judgment: 
"In order to assert a breach of contract claim, Defendant 
must plead that Plaintiff is in breach of an express promise 
made by Plaintiff. The only express promise asserted by 
Defendant is not an express promise. Defendant asserts that 
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the Agreement states that Plaintiff 'encourages a process 
of communication with its clients as legal work proceeds 
to insure not only that they are kept abreast of events, but 
that matters progress to their satisfaction/ In examining 
the above language, Plaintiff does not expressly promise 
to communicate with clients or Defendant, Plaintiff 
encourages communication. If Plaintiff had stated within 
the agreement that Plaintiff shall reasonably communicate 
with client or Defendant, an express term would exist, but 
in this case, an express promise clearly does not." 
The firm is the drafter of the agreement. The firm by this statement is 
clearly showing that it has no problem apparently attempting to mislead or induce 
its clients into believing, through this language, that the firm will keep its clients 
abreast of important aspects about their case and that it will communicate with 
them, all the while only viewing this language as "a practice that is encouraged 
internally at the firm." 
The firm asserted the following argument regarding this contractual 
language on page 23 of Plaintiff s Response to Defendant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment: 
"Moreover, the only express language cited by Defendant 
is Plaintiff 'encourages a process of communication.' As 
previously pointed out, this is not an express promise, but 
a practice that is encouraged internally at the firm. It 
is more of an informational statement. Therefore, the 
second required prong of Defendant's cause of action 
should also fail." 
If the firm believed this language to be merely informational and only a 
practice encouraged internally at the firm, it was Mr. Gentry's duty to inform 
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Deanna that this language is merely informational only and does not mean that the 
firm will actually have to communicate with its Client nor does the firm have to 
keep its Client abreast of important aspects about her case, nor is the firm actually 
obligated to see that matters progress to Deanna's satisfaction. The firm never 
informed its Client that it was not required to do these things. 
In the event this Court determines that, at the very least, that language is 
ambiguous and not "simply imaginative parsing of contract language to avoid its 
clear intent," as the trial court determined in his summary ruling, for this Court's 
information, Deanna addressed the law concerning ambiguous language in 
contracts on page 30 of her opposition as follows: 
"In Jones, Waldo v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that: 
cOur own court of appeals in PADD v. Graystone 
Pines Homeowners Ass'n, 789 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), construing a written fee agreement between an 
attorney and his client, quoted with approval the following 
rule enunciated in Hitchcock v. Skelly Oil Co., 201 Kan. 260, 
440 P.2d 552, 554 (1968): "It is the general rule that in 
construing a contract between attorney and client, doubts 
are resolved against the attorney and the construction 
adopted which is favorable to the client.55 In McAdam v. 
Dynes, 442 N.W.2d 914, 916(N.D. 1989), the court held 
that because of the confidential nature of the 
attorney-client relationship, "compensation agreements 
made during the existence of that relationship are 
closely scrutinized and construed most strongly against 
the attorney." See 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client section 
306 (1980) (stating that foregoing rules are "general 
rule55 followed in most cases). The rule is often invoked 
in disputes between attorneys and clients arising out of 
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ambiguities in a written fee agreement. The rule that 
doubts are to be resolved against the attorney comports 
with the general rule of contract interpretation that 
ambiguous language is to be construed against the 
drafter: In choosing among the reasonable meanings 
of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that 
meaning is generally preferred which operates against 
the party who supplies the words or from whom a 
writing otherwise proceeds. Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts section 206 (1981) see also 3 Arthur L. 
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, section 559 (1960) (to 
the same effect)."5 
The trial court erred in ruling that, (1), Deanna failed to plead that 
she performed under the contract and, (2), that she failed to assert a breach of an 
express promise by the firm, and, therefore, abused his discretion in granting the 
firm's motion for summary judgment dismissing Deanna's breach of contract 
cause of action. The trial court has the duty for summary judgment purposes to 
view the Answer and Counterclaim and other documents submitted before him in 
their entirety to determine whether there are other express promises as well that the 
firm allegedly did not perform. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEANNA'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTY CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
BECAUSE DEANNA PROPERLY PLED CAUSAL CONNECTION AND 
DAMAGES RESULTING THEREFROM 
The firm conceded that an attorney-client relationship existed and that the 
firm had various fiduciary and ethical duties to Deanna as a result of the attorney-
client relationship. However, the firm disputes that it breached any of its fiduciary 
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and ethical duties it owed Deanna and suggests that even if a breach of the 
relationship took place, no causal link to damages exists. The firm goes on to 
assert that Deanna must demonstrate that she would have prevailed in her case "or 
not suffered any damages, but for the actions o f the firm. 
The firm listed the following damages that Deanna alleges resulted from its 
action: complete forfeiture of attorney fees, compensation in the amount of 
$4,500, compensation in the amount of $5,400 for attorney fees paid to new 
counsel, damages for emotional distress, compensation for medical expenses, 
punitive damages and attorney fees incurred in defending and prosecuting this 
action, 
Deanna, as shown on p. 27 of her memorandum in opposition to the motion 
for summary judgment, argued that the firm breached its duties by failing to 
exercise due diligence, adequate communication to apprise her of her case status, 
and failing to demonstrate on a basic human level integrity and loyalty to her in 
front of the opposing counsel. It is not a surprise that Deanna lost faith in her 
counsel and questioned that loyalty. In In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978), 
the Supreme Court of Utah determined that an attorney's disloyal conduct to his 
client did not measure up to the high standard of fidelity in dealing with clients that 
members of the Bar should maintain, and that his disloyal conduct constituted a 
breach of his professional duty and of his contract with his client. The court 
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further determined that he should not be entitled to the fee paid him for the 
promised services. 'Where there has been a deviation from proper professional 
standards, there should be some appropriate penalty, not only for the effect upon 
the attorney but as a salutary measure for the benefit of the Bar and the public/ See 
In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978). 
In this case, summary judgment on this issue was inappropriate. Whether 
the firm breached its professional duty and contract with Deanna is a question best 
left in the hands of a jury. Deanna properly pled the cause of action, thereby 
allowing this matter to be heard before a jury of her peers. 
The firm, on p. 13 of its memorandum of points and authorities in support of 
motion for summary judgment, suggests the possibility of punitive damages, citing 
Utah Code Annotated section 78-18-l(l)(a); Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc. 
675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983); cited in Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.2d 
1064 (Utah 2003). 
The firm goes on to characterize Deanna5 s breach of fiduciary duty cause of 
action as one alleging the following: "Again, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did 
not do proper research, failed to properly communicate, laughed when opposing 
counsel made sarcastic statements regarding Defendant, billed too much and 
padded bills,. . ." The firm also characterized, on pp. 15 and 16 of its motion for 
summary judgment, Deanna's present case as one alleging the following: 
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"In the present case, Defendant has asserted that Plaintiff 
has engaged in the following conduct: 'intentional 
misconduct, disloyalty to its client, breach of confidentiality 
in order to harm former client, fraudulent billing, failing 
to communicate with its client, and failure to disclose 
important facts about the case in order to give its client 
the right to make informed decisions about her case,5 
did not return phone calls, failed to disclose the 
existence of a trial memorandum, were present when 
Mr. Hughes stated, 'you got the money, I got the 
time, [and] she's got the money, bill her heavy,' 
laughed at the comment by Mr. Hughes, making 
disturbing derogatory comments about the 
Defendant's husband, billing practices were fraudulent 
and willful, contacting Mr. Hughes regarding the 
case and the breach of Defendant." 
The firm, on p. 16, then stated: "The conduct asserted by Defendant is at best 
'tortuous, injurious, or malicious," . . . . Again, the firm argued that "punitive 
damages will only be awarded in Utah 'upon clear and convincing proof of "willful 
and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of others."' 
As shown above, Deanna can prove "but for" the actions (that is, the breach 
of the firm's fiduciary duties it owed to Deanna) of this Law Firm, Deanna would 
not have sustained the damages that directly resulted from the firm's breach. 
Therefore, summary judgment should not have been rendered against Deanna on 
her breach of fiduciary duty cause of action and the facts surrounding this cause of 
action should be placed before a jury. 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEANNA'S INTENTIONAL INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE DEANNA PROPERLY PLED FACTS THAT 
CAN CONSTITUTE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS 
The firm in its argument cited Bennett v. Jones. 70 P.3d 17 (Utah 2003) in 
which cc[t]o be considered outrageous, the conduct must evoke outrage or 
revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair. . . Conduct 'is not 
necessarily outrageous merely because it is tortuous, injurious, or malicious, or 
because it would give rise to punitive damage, or because it is illegal.5 . . . 'The 
liability [for intentional infliction of emotional distress] clearly does not extend to 
mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other 
trivialities.'" (Citations omitted). 
To support its motion, the firm noted Deanna's assertions of its conduct, 
including: 
'intentional misconduct, disloyalty to its client, breach of confidentiality in order to 
harm former client, fraudulent billing, failure to communicate with its client, and 
failure to disclose important facts about the case in order to give its client the right 
to make informed decisions about her case,5 did not return phone calls, failed to 
disclose the existence of a trial memorandum, were present when Mr. Hughes 
stated, cyou got the money, I got the time, [and] she's got the money, bill her 
heavy,5 laughed at the comment by Mr. Hughes, making disturbing derogatory 
comments about Defendant's husband, billing practices were fraudulent and 
willful, contacting Mr. Hughes regarding the case and the breach of Defendant. 
As shown above, the Utah Supreme Court in the Bennett v. Jones case, 
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held that "conduct is not necessarily outrageous merely because it is tortuous, 
injurious, or malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive damage, or 
because it is illegal (emphasis added)." The Utah Supreme Court, by the use of the 
language of "not necessarily outrageous . . . , " leaves open the cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress for conduct that is tortuous, injurious, or 
malicious and that type of conduct can be considered outrageous, depending upon 
whether that conduct evokes outrage and revulsion. The firm then states the 
following, on p. 16: "The conduct asserted by Defendant is at best "tortuous, 
injurious, or malicious,. . ." 
Deanna, in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, on p. 29, 
defended her factual allegations and cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Essentially, the issue as to whether the conduct was outrageous 
or not should be left in the hands of a jury, not the trial court in a motion for 
summary judgment. Due to the extreme emotional tax placed upon Deanna over 
the desecration of her son's grave, any such conduct to which the firm has best 
characterized as "tortuous, injurious, or malicious" may indeed be considered 
outrageous. Once again, such a question should have been placed in the hands of 
Deanna' peers, not the trial court. In addition, Deanna did plead damages as a 
result of the firm's outrageous conduct in her Answer and Counterclaim. (See 
Record Index p. 7.) 
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THE FEE AGREEMENT DOES NOT ALLOW FOR ATTTORNEY'S FEES 
IN PROSECUTING ITS BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM NOR DOES IT 
ALLOW FOR RECOVERY OF FEES ACCRUED IN DEFENSE OF 
DEANNA'S CAUSES OF ACTION, 
The trial court awarded the firm $14,204.00 of attorney fees to handle 
this "simple debt collection case," as defined by the firm in its documents 
presented to the trial court, without ever requiring the firm to comply with 
Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in his judgment dated July 12, 2004. 
(See Addendum at Al 1, Record Index p. 740.) 
The firm argued that it is entitled to attorney fees in this case to prosecute its 
breach of contract cause of action and also to defend Deanna's breach of contract, 
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims. The firm, on p. 17 of its memorandum of points and authorities in support 
of its motion for summary judgment, quoted the contractual attorney fee provision 
as follows: "in the event collection procedures become necessary with respect to a 
delinquent account where the account is assigned to an outside attorney firm, all 
the costs and expenses including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred in collecting such delinquent account shall be added to [the] . . . bill." 
The facts of the case fail to substantiate the firm's position, and highlights 
once again that there are issues of material fact yet to be decided. The firm 
admitted that the last bill sent to Deanna regarding the May 7, 2003 invoice was 
inaccurate and that Deanna was not obliged to pay it. This admission by the firm 
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was made only after the following occurred: (1) the firm filed a Complaint for fees; 
(2) the firm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment Motion and Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of that Motion for Summary Judgment, with 
Affidavits of Shawn T. Farris and Eric R. Gentry supporting the motion and 
affirming that the fees billed were fair and reasonable (see Record Index, p. 56); 
(3) Deanna filed her memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment, 
with her affidavit affirming that the fees were not fair and reasonable and by 
attaching a copy of the May 7, 2003 invoice to show the trial court the 
unreasonableness and unfairness of fees billed; and (4) the firm filed its Reply to 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment on September 4, 2003, see Record Index p. 98, wherein the firm states 
that bill was inaccurate and attaches its billing ledger showing the amount 
$7,025.00 as due and owing and a "Sample Invoice" for charges the firm never 
billed. Deanna reasonably refused to pay for such a bill, and this led to additional 
questions as to the firm's billing practices. As such, there are material facts 
regarding the firm's billing practice that must be decided at trial, and not 
summarily resolved through this motion for summary judgment. 
The trial court erred in his determination that there are no material facts in 
this case. If the trial court and this Court just viewed the above facts in a light 
most favorable to Deanna, this Court should determine that it is possible that the 
34 
firm fully intended to make its client pay the fraudulent bill, either by receiving 
payment from Deanna from the mailed invoice or by having the trial court grant 
summary judgment and obtaining the fraudulent fees that way. The above facts, if 
taken in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, show that the firm 
created a "Sample Invoice" and a "Billing Ledger" in order to commit fraud upon 
its client and in an attempt to allow the Court to award fraudulent fees under a 
motion for summary judgment. 
In addition, the fact that the firm would mail the May 7, 2003 invoice 
to Deanna and expect her to pay it would lead any reasonable person to question 
the validity, honesty and accuracy of each and every bill submitted previously. 
The firm would not have sued its client if Deanna paid the inaccurate bill. (See 
Addendum at A3, May 7, 2003 invoice.) Further, the contractual language the firm 
uses to support its award of attorney's fees in this case does not anticipate mailing 
"fraudulent" or "inaccurate" billing statements to its client and then suing its 
client over "fraudulent," "inaccurate" or "unbilled" fees. 
In addition, on pp. 4 and 5 of Record Index p. 718, under the heading 
"Objection to Plaintiffs Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs," Deanna objected to 
the affidavit of the firm's counsel supporting its award of attorney fees as follows: 
"Plaintiffs counsel's affidavit does not establish the 
reasonableness of the attorney and non-lawyer fees 
requested because of his failure to provide for each 
item of work the names of the attorneys and 
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non-lawyers and the hourly rate for each person who 
performed the work. Rule 73(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure states the following: 
c(b) An affidavit supporting a request for 
or augmentation of attorney fees shall forth: 
(b)(1) the basis for the award; (b)(2) a reasonably 
detailed description of the time spent and work 
performed, including for each item of work the 
name, position (such as attorney, paralegal, 
administrative assistant, etc.) and hourly rate 
of the persons who performed the work; (b)(3) 
factors showing the reasonableness of the 
fees. . . .' (emphasis added)" 
The trial court failed to require the firm's counsel to comply with Rule 73(b) 
and abused his discretion by awarding the attorney fees requested without 
compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, if this Court deems 
the contractual language to provide an award of attorney fees to the firm's counsel 
and if this Court affirms the summary ruling and judgment, then this Court must at 
least remand the issue of the reasonableness of the firm's counsel's fee in order to 
make its counsel comply with Rule 73(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court made the following statement in its summary ruling: 
"There may be issues as to many immaterial facts, but much of Defendant's 
argument is simply imaginative parsing of contract language to avoid its clear 
intent. Summary judgment may not be avoided by resorting to quibbling over 
irrelevancies." The trial court clearly erred in his ruling and abused his discretion 
by awarding attorney fees to the firm based upon the contractual language, by not 
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reviewing the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the non-moving party, and by not requiring the firm to comply with Rule 73 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, this Court should vacate the award 
of attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court clearly erred and abused his discretion when he failed to 
apply the same standard of law to the breach of contract causes of action for both 
parties. The trial court clearly erred by his failure to view the facts and inferences 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and look at those facts 
and inferences as a whole to determine if a cause of action exists for Deanna. The 
trial court clearly erred by his failure to review the Answer and Counterclaim and 
all the documents presented before him by Deanna to determine that Deanna did 
plead appropriately all her causes of action. Therefore, this Court should vacate 
the summary ruling, vacate the judgment, vacate the award of attorney fees, and 
remand the case back for jury trial. 
Deanna also asks this Court to award her attorney fees and costs on appeal, 
depending upon its view of the contractual language, based upon the Utah Code 
Ann. Section 78-27-56.5 (1996) that provides as follows: "A court may award 
costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
promissory notes, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, 
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when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow 
at least one party to recover attorney's fees.'" 
DATED: March fo
 r 2005. 
Michael Sanft ^ 
S Attorney for Appellant Deanna Pugh 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ day of March, 2005,1 mailed two copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following: 
Heath Snow 
BARNEY & McKENNA, P.C. 
63 South 300 Bast, Suite 202 
P.O. Box 2710 
St. George, Utah 84771-2710 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FORpY-
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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SUMMARY RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030501122 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
which was filed with a supporting memorandum and other materials on May 11, 2004. 
Defendant filed her opposing memorandum and materials on May 24, 2004. Plaintiff filed 
a reply memorandum on June 1,2004 and a request to submit for decision on June 4, 2004. 
Neither party requested a hearing. 
Having reviewed the lengthy memoranda and numerous other materials filed by the 
parties, the Court grants Plaintiffs motion for the following reasons: 
1. Despite the length of the memoranda, the Court finds no genuine issue of 
material fact. There may be issues as to many immaterial facts, but much of Defendant5 s 
argument is simply imaginative parsing of contract language to avoixHts ~clear~intent. 
Summary judgment may not be avoided by resorting to quibbling over irrelevancies. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as requested in its motion. 
Defendant's arguments fail because they are, variously, (a) based on unrealistic expecta tions, 
such as Plaintiffs failure to answer questions that Defendant never asked, (b) based on an 
unrealistic view of the attorney/client relationship, both generally and as pertaining to the 
facts of this case, (c) based on cynical speculation about acts, motives, and events which did 
not occur, (d) based on a lack of understanding of the unusual nature of the legal matter for 
which Defendant originally employed Plaintiff, and (e) based on a lack of understanding of, 
or a refusal to understand, the nature of legal services and the ethical obligations of attorneys. 
3. Defendant's memorandum appears to be the product of the unauthorized 
practice of law. Defendant has repeatedly argued to this Court that she lacks the training and 
ability to represent herself, and the Court agrees with Defendant on this point and has advised 
her to get an attorney. At least twice, Defendant has attempted to be represented by a person 
not licensed to practice law, and the Court has entered at least two orders denying 
Defendant's attempts. In light of these facts, Defendant's 31-page memorandum, with 19 
attachments and many citations to legal authorities, clearly appears to be the product of the 
unauthorized practice of law by some unidentified person who is hoping to "assist" 
Defendant. This Court does not sanction the unauthorized practice of law or knowingly 
allow any litigant to profit from the unauthorized practice of law. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion is granted and judgment shall be entered for (1) the 
full amount of unpaid fees for Plaintiffs services rendered, (2) interest at the contract rate 
on all unpaid fees, and (3) reasonable attorney's fees and costs for this action; Plaintiffs 
2 
counsel should submit an appropriate judgment pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Dated this ^ \ day of June, 2004. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this <Q3 day ofU^UNg. , 2004,1 provided true and correct 
copies of the foregoing SUMMARY RULING to each of the attorneys/parties named below 
by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse 
in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States Mail, first-class postage 
prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Heath Snow 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 2710 
St. George, Utah 84771 
Deanna Pugh 
Defendant 
448 East Telegraph, No. 78 
Washington, Utah 84780 
a{ nU(^d-
DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT 
4 
ORIGINAL - ^ ^i^s^^ 
BARNEY & McKENNA, P.C. 
HEATH H. SNOW - 8563 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
63 South 300 East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770-2948 
(435)628-1711 
(435) 628-3318 fax 
www .barn ey- mckcn na. co m 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 







Civil No. 030501122 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
The above-entitled Court, having issued its Summary Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment on June 23, 2004 and having reviewed Plaintiffs 2nd Affidavit of Attorney 
Fees and Costs, and for good cause showing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff shall have 
Judgment against Defendant, Deanna Pugh, as follows: 
$ 9,806.89 Principal as of April 17, 2003 
$ 2,100.56 Pre-Judgment Interest @ 18% (434 days x $4 84 per diem) 
$ 388.71 Costs , >. 
£P^re=3ft333a I H ^ O ^ Attorneys Fees per Affidavit1 /wa»v-W^a<--fe« AsA-*cW —<&>) 
TOTAL JUDGMENT 
1
 Said Attorneys Fees includes the $2,082 25 requested in its Proposed (unsigned) Judgment stemming from the 
Courts award of attorneys in connection with Plaintiffs successful prosecution of its Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions 
1 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said 
Judgment shall accrue interest at the post judgment contract rate of 18% per annum from the date 
of entry of this Judgment until paid in full. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that in the event it 
becomes necessary for Plaintiff to execute upon this Judgment, Defendant shall pay alfeadditional 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in the execution of the Judgment, in addition to the costs and 
attorney's fees outlined herein above. 
TT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said 
judgment shall be certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
SO ORDERED this 1 ^ day of ^ N ^ V A , 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
G. RAND BEACHAM 
5th District Court Judge 
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